I. EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Existing Cloud services suffer from several weaknesses regarding privacy and security [1] . A preliminary analysis shows that they are subject to a number of vulnerabilities ranging from insecure interfaces to insecure Hypervisors [2] . Starting from these vulnerabilities as the first step of a broader research activity, we came up with a new approach that is very promising in re-visiting security and privacy problems in Cloud based systems.
At a first glance, the Everything as a Service paradigm proposed by Cloud computing is changing de facto the way Internet users, such as individuals, institutions and companies, deal with data storage and computation. Globally deployed cost-efficient and scalable resources are made available on demand, allowing users to access them via lightweight devices and reliable Internet connection. In recent reports, Comscore pointed out that 9.4 million new smartphones were acquired in EU5 1 in December 2012, and 136 million people now have a smartphone in this area [3] . Moreover, 92% of the world's data has been created in just the last two years, and right now popular Cloud platforms such as YouTube store 72 hours of new videos every minute [4] .
Nevertheless, evidence shows that the benefits from apparently unlimited resources come at extremely high security and privacy costs [5] . User identity, location and activity information is constantly uploaded and synchronized at Cloud providers' facilities through mobile services, online social networks, search engines and collaborative productivity tools. Such data can be misused both by the provider itself and by attackers taking control of it. Additionally, due to the huge user base, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks reveal to be more effective.
While dependability can be addressed by running several service instances on different Clouds at increased costs, therefore moving to the so-called Cloud-of-clouds, security and privacy vulnerabilities still remain open issues and have a severe impact on user trust in the Cloud [6] .
Adoption of an appropriate encryption mechanism may appear a viable solution to protect user privacy. Unfortunately, securing outsourced data and computation against untrusted Clouds through encryption is cost-unfeasible [7] , being outsourcing mechanisms up to several orders of magnitude costlier than their non-outsourced, locally run, alternatives. Moreover, 1 UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. the simple use of encryption to provide data confidentiality and integrity fails to hide sensitive information such as user identity and location, session time and communication traces.
However, even at the presence of fine-grained, costeffective security and privacy protection tools based on encryption, current Cloud solutions would still suffer from a main orthogonal problem: the intrinsic contrast between their business model and user privacy. As a matter of fact, all current Cloud services are run by companies with a direct interest in increasing their user-base and user demand; service level agreements are often stringent to the user, and countermeasures against privacy violations are usually taken a-posteriori, once the violation has been detected. Given the promising public Cloud service market size, which is estimated to grow from $129.9 billion in 2013 to $206.6 billion in 2016 [8] , Cloud providers are not likely to address this problem in the near future.
Hence as the first objective of our approach we claim that user privacy in Cloud systems can only be assured through the avoidance of centralized control by an omniscient authority. Infrastructure-less peer-to-peer (P2P) model thus seems to be a natural base to build a solution that avoids centralized control. A corollary of the P2P model on the other hand is the lack of a priori trust among parties, which comes as an additional requirement. As the second strong point of our approach we suggest that trust in communications and distributed computing can be built based on the trust relationships users running peer nodes entertain in their real life. Thus, network nodes operated by people who are friends in the real life can leverage on this friendship relation to build trusted channels or to enforce cooperation in a self-organizing system such as an ad hoc network or a P2P application.
We therefore suggest a privacy-preserving distributed architecture for a Cloud platform based on these two principles, that is, a P2P overlay that leverages social trust [9] . This architecture leverages on existing trust among users to provide Cloud services and anonymize traffic. In such architecture, each participant is associated to a User Identifier (UId) and joins the network from multiple devices associated to different Node Identifiers (NIds). Resources of the participant's devices are available to the participant himself, and to the participant's trusted contacts and contacts-of-contacts with the participant's consent.
Our system consists of three main components: a Web of Trust (WoT), a Distributed Hash Table ( The WoT provides the basic distributed structure used to supply Cloud services, the DHT provides a basic dictionary service to perform lookups, finally each TIS serves the purpose of user authentication.
The WoT is a digital mapping of the trust relationships users entertain in their real life, and serves the purpose of Cloud service provisioning. In a user's WoT view, each user's trusted contact acts as a Trusted Cloud Service Provider (TCSP), and provides the user with storage and computing resources. Such resources can be allocated both on the TCSP hardware and in that one of its respective TCSPs ones. However, since we don't assume transitivity of trust, a TCSP of a user's TCSP is considered an Untrusted Cloud Service Provider (UCSP). To preserve both the consumer's privacy and the trust edges in the WoT, UCSP resources are transparently accessed through TCSP only. Finally, in case a TCSP is offline, the set of UCSP resources accessible through that TCSP is still reachable through a set of Auxiliary Access Points (AAPs), which lead to the TCSP contacts through random walks on the WoT graph.
The DHT is implemented by an overlay on top of the internet where peers are arranged thanks to their NId and serves the purpose of TCSP lookup. The DHT is maintained by the users' nodes and provides three distinct lookup services: it returns IP addresses associated to a target NId; it returns a list of AAP for a given UId; it returns the UId associated to a target TCSP identity, such as the user's full name. Therefore, the DHT allows for building the WoT overlay and addressing the TCSP services.
TISs are independent trusted parties serving the purpose of user and device authentication. A TIS provides each user with a certified UId and a set of certified NIds, one for each user device. Any TIS computes identifiers starting from the user's real identity by running the same algorithm. TISs are offline entities contacted at the first join and do not play any role neither in the communication between users nor in the Cloud service provisioning. Consequently, they do not break the main purpose of decentralization.
A newcomer generates a series of public-private key pairs, contacts a TIS and obtains as an answer his User-and NodeIdentifiers, together with certificates associating each identifier with a public key. The newcomer device joins the DHT thanks to the Node Identifier, and the newcomer starts looking for trusted contacts from a series of properties such as the contact name. As an answer, the newcomer receives a set of AAPs for different User Identifiers, and starts retrieving publicly available profile data associated to each identifier through the respective AAPs. Once identified the correct trusted contact, the newcomer sends a contact request to the AAPs which is forwarded along a random walk on the WoT graph. Replies are forwarded back along the same path. A new trusted link is therefore established in the WoT graph. Contact requests contain available devices Node Identifiers and a series of secrets to access their running services. The newcomer queries the P2P system for the IP addresses of each device, and establishes one-hop connections with them. The newcomer then sends to the trusted contact a random walk request, which will create a random walk ending to an AAP for the newcomer.
By repeating the abovementioned process, the newcomer adds further real-life trusted contacts and creates a random walk for each of them. The newcomer's trusted contacts act as TCSPs and provide services encompassing Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS).
The sensitive information describing WoT users and their relationships is protected through encryption and anonymization techniques similar to onion routing, applied to random walks on the WoT graph. Each hop corresponds to a real life friendship link, thus both enhancing hop-by-hop cooperation and reducing the presence of malicious nodes in the communication paths.
We plan to develop a full model of the system in order to study the service availability. We have already started to develop a prototype based on the new WebRTC 2 technology, which allows to build a P2P network from popular web browsers. We plan to complete our prototype and integrate it with popular IaaS solutions such as OpenStack and SaaS such as Hadoop. Since trust between users does not correspond to trust on their hardware, we plan to investigate new mechanisms to guarantee the execution and correctness of a sequence of operations at the Cloud side. Finally, we also plan to evaluate the tradeoff between usage control and anonymity through new distributed collaborative privacy policy enforcement schemes.
